“Never Again,” Again:
Darfur, the Genocide Convention, and the Duty to Prevent Genocide by Jafari, Jamal
8AFTER EVERY 20TH CENTURY GENOCIDE, the worlddeclared it would “never again” allow such a crime tooccur. Now, with the situation in Sudan’s Darfur regionsteadily deteriorating, the international community is
once again in danger of breaking its promise. The international
community is no closer to actually preventing genocide in Darfur
than it was in Rwanda in 1994, in Cambodia, or in Nazi Germany.
The problem is not political will, for political will alone is insuffi-
cient to bring about the type of change necessary to stop genocide.
The problem lies in the inability of the international community
to set up permanent structures to prevent or limit the spread of
genocide.
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, when offering an inter-
pretation of the Genocide Convention, placed the onus on the
United Nations to take action. If individual states, however, want
to give the UN greater responsibility to prevent genocide, the UN
should be better equipped to do so. Ultimately, the lesson of
Darfur could lead to the birth of multilateral institutions that are
more immune to diplomatic delays and can deal with a crisis that
demands early action. 
The international community should examine Darfur closely
and divine lessons to be applied to future conflicts. First, allega-
tions of genocide in Darfur should be closely scrutinized in light of
the Genocide Convention. Second, a debate should ensue sur-
rounding the interpretation of the Genocide Convention’s ability
to prevent genocide. Third, more effective methods for preventing
genocide should be discussed and acted upon. Finally, the needs of
Darfurians still at risk should be the world’s top priority. Genocide
is an on-going process that can be stopped. But, if the internation-
al community fails to address the needs of Darfurians in internal-
ly displaced camps or refugee camps, this genocide may very well
continue unchecked. 
BACKGROUND
THE ROOTS OF THE DARFUR CONFLICT lie in historic disagree-
ments over land use. Black African farmers occupy land that
nomadic Arabs want for grazing. Periodic skirmishes have
emerged over the years but never to the level of a major conflict.
In 2003, two rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), sought to gain a
greater share of national resources for the black African popula-
tion of the region. 
Meanwhile, all of Sudan is waiting for a potential resolution
of the 20-year civil war that pits the primarily Arab government in
Khartoum against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA),
comprised primarily of black Africans in southern Sudan. A peace
deal is on the table that gives southern Sudanese a greater share of
their natural resources and the possibility of greater autonomy. The
Darfurian rebel groups have seized on this opportunity to seek
more resources from Khartoum, although they have been careful
to refrain from any claims of independence.
The Sudanese government has targeted civilians in this con-
flict, which has led to allegations of genocide. The government
exploited the traditional tensions between the black African and
Arab populations by arming the Arab-dominated Janjaweed mili-
tia and fighting alongside them in Darfur. Instead of focusing on
rebel elements, they sought to eliminate black Africans from the
region. Although the reasoning for targeting civilians is open to
interpretation, the Sudanese government most likely wanted to
warn potential rebel groups across Sudan not to oppose the gov-
ernment, as the SPLA has in southern Sudan.
LEGAL EVIDENCE OF GENOCIDE IN DARFUR
THE ATROCITIES IN DARFUR CLEARLY CONSTITUTE GENOCIDE
according to the legal standards set forth in the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948
(Genocide Convention). The Genocide Convention established a
three-pronged test to determine genocide. First, Article II states
that the acts in question must be perpetrated against a “national,
racial, ethnical or religious group.” Second, the accused party must
have committed one of five enumerated acts:  killing, causing seri-
ous bodily or mental harm, imposing conditions on a group calcu-
lated to bring about their destruction in whole or in part, prevent-
ing births within the group, or forcibly transferring children from
the group. Finally, the accused party must have perpetrated the acts
in question with the intent to destroy the group, “in whole or in
part.”
GROUP DEFINITION
The non-Arab population of Darfur constitutes a “group”
under the language of the Genocide Convention. In defining the
term “group,” the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) has stated that the political, social, and cultural context of
the targeted group should be taken into consideration. In this case,
the group is primarily composed of members of the Zaghawa,
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9Massalit, and Fur ethnicities, and are all black African and non-
Arab. They all have historical roots in the region and speak a Nilo-
Saharan language distinct from Arabic. Finally, they are being
exploited in a conflict which pits nomadic Arab herders against
sedentary black African farmers. While this evidence clearly satis-
fies the “group” definition, the additional fact that there are hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees at the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) camps in Chad who are all
black African is damning evidence in and of itself.
ENUMERATED ACTS
It is clear that four of the five enumerated acts in the
Genocide Convention are occurring in Darfur, although only one
is necessary to satisfy the definition of genocide. First, it is appar-
ent that killings have occurred in the affected group. The August
2004 State Department report states that, of the 1,136 refugees
interviewed, 61% said they had seen a family member killed, 67%
had seen a non-family member killed, and 44% had witnessed a
death by shooting. Observers currently estimate at least 70,000
deaths in Darfur since the conflict began in 2003, most from mal-
nutrition and disease.
Second, evidence collected by the UN, the U.S. State
Department, the International Crisis Group, and Human Rights
Watch, among others, indicates that the Sudanese government and
the Janjaweed have perpetrated “serious bodily or mental harm.”
The ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) have defined this term to mean actual harm
that may or may not be permanent. In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the
ICTR defined “mental harm” to include rape. The evidence for
these crimes in Darfur is highly incriminating. The State
Department report indicated that 21% of the Darfurians inter-
viewed experienced or witnessed a beating, 25% experienced or
witnessed an abduction, 16% experienced or witnessed a rape,
67% experienced or witnessed an aerial bombing of a village, and
81% experienced or witnessed the destruction of a village.
Numerous reports from human rights organizations, as well as
interviews conducted by the author, confirm this point.
Third, the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed have
inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical
destruction of non-Arabs in Darfur. The Akayesu case defined this
element as conditions which do not necessarily kill, but “ultimate-
ly seek the victim’s physical destruction.” The UN Preparatory
Committee for the International Criminal Court has stated that
deprivation of food or medical services fits the definition. The
State Department report and numerous human rights and press
reports indicate that villages in Darfur are routinely ransacked of
all valuables, including food, and destroyed. Refugees have report-
ed that aerial bombing raids preceded ground attacks and targeted
wells and livestock. Many villagers reported that ground troops
specifically targeted food stores for destruction. In the majority of
cases, villages were completely burned to the ground. 
Finally, the affected group has experienced measures intend-
ed to prevent births. Both the ICTY and the ICTR have indicated
that rape satisfies this definition. The fact that 16% of those inter-
viewed in the State Department report claim to have witnessed or
experienced a rape is a disturbingly high number for a crime that
has a history of being underreported. There are also reports of per-
petrators telling victims that they are being raped to create “light”
babies—babies that appear Arab—so as to repopulate the area with
Arabs instead of black Darfurians. In addition, there are numerous
reports of men being targeted in Darfur, both to reduce the num-
ber of men of fighting age and to ensure they will not procreate,
thereby reducing the non-Arab population. 
INTENT TO DESTROY IN WHOLE OR IN PART
In considering genocide, it is most difficult to prove the ele-
ment of intent. According to international standards, the Sudanese
government and the Janjaweed have demonstrated the requisite
intent to destroy the affected group in Darfur in whole or in part.
The ICTR has ruled that the scale of the attacks, evidence of sys-
tematic planning, and statements of the perpetrators can all be
taken into account when analyzing the intent element. In addition,
the intent element can be satisfied by showing a desire to destroy
the affected group in part. The ICTY and ICTR define “in part”
as the intent to destroy a “considerable” or “substantial” number of
the affected group.
The scale of the attacks clearly indicates the intent to destroy
the affected population in Darfur, at least in part. The Sudanese
government and Janjaweed militia were responsible for the deaths
of 70,000 people and for driving 2.25 million from their villages.
This means the majority of non-Arab residents of Darfur are either
dead, in refugee camps in Chad, or in internally displaced person
camps in other parts of Darfur. 
There is also evidence of systematic planning based on the
uniform nature of most attacks and statements overheard by vic-
tims. By and large, villages in Darfur were bombed by Sudanese
government planes and helicopters. These bombings continued for
days or months until a ground force, comprised usually of
Janjaweed militia fighting alongside government troops, invaded
the villages. Gunfire rained down onto civilians as they were
chased from their homes. Afterwards, the villages were looted of
valuables and often burned. This scenario played out time and
time again across Darfur. In addition, 33% of the refugees inter-
viewed for the State Department report indicated they heard their
attackers use racial epithets. Often villagers were told, “This is no
longer the home of the blacks” and “We will drive the blacks out
of here,” among other racially motivated language.
The Sudanese government claims that the offensive attacks
target rebels and are justifiable based on its need to defend against
attack. The ICTR, however, ruled that the presence of a conflict
between armed groups is not justification for genocide. In addi-
tion, the State Department report and interviews conducted by the
“If the international community fails to address the needs of
Darfurians . . . this genocide may very well continue unchecked.” 
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author confirm that the vast majority of village attacks occurred on
villages with no rebel presence. In the few situations where rebels
were present, they numbered only ten or twenty combatants facing
a government and Janjaweed force of thousands.
Therefore, there can be little doubt that, based upon an appli-
cation of the facts to international standards, the atrocities in
Darfur amount to genocide. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE OBLIGATION TO
“PREVENT” GENOCIDE
ON SEPTEMBER 9, 2004, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE Colin Powell
broke new ground when he declared that the situation in Darfur
constitutes genocide. Never before has a sovereign nation invoked
the Genocide Convention to characterize another conflict. This
was partially due to fears that the Convention required action to
“prevent” genocide from all its signatories. Secretary Powell seized
on language in Article 8 which states that contracting parties may
call upon “competent organs” of the UN to take measures “which
they consider appropriate” to prevent genocide. The specific action
is not enumerated, nor is the exact mechanism for action. He went
on to indicate that the United States was satisfying its obligations
under the Genocide Convention by providing money for human-
itarian assistance, engaging diplomatically, and working through
the UN Security Council for a resolution.
In the end, the declaration shifted a great degree of the
responsibility for preventing genocide from individual states to the
UN. Secretary Powell’s testimony removed a roadblock that had
not been discussed since the passage of the Convention—the obli-
gation of sovereign states to use force to stop genocide.
Contracting parties will not likely feel compelled to commit troops
to prevent genocide merely due to vague Convention language
compelling them to act. Now, the focus of genocide prevention
should shift to the needs of competent multilateral institutions.
Their response must mirror those to other humanitarian disasters
such as disease or famine. The world community must react swift-
ly and avoid political delays in order to protect those who lack the
means to defend themselves. 
THE FUTURE OF GENOCIDE PREVENTION
THE LEGACY OF THE WORLD RESPONSE to the Rwandan genocide
was a chain of broken promises. The legacy of Darfur can and
should be different. But if the international community is going to
shift the burden of prevention, it should empower the UN with
legitimate “competent organs” capable of meeting the challenge.
The appointment of Juan Mendez as the newly created UN Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide is a welcome step, but it is
not enough. 
A PERMANENT GENOCIDE COMMISSION SHOULD BE
ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE UN
The world needs a permanent Genocide Commission with
the authority to commit investigators, recommend a plan of
action, and make determinations of genocide based on interna-
tionally recognized norms. The Commission, which, as a UN
body, would carry the moral backing of world opinion, should be
comprised of eminent scholars and independent experts with a
mandate to receive requests from any party to the Genocide
Convention.
A new Genocide Commission should be empowered to inves-
tigate before events on the ground reach the level of genocide. Such
a commission would be valuable in unifying an international
response and issuing recommendations to UN bodies and member
states regarding a response. If such a commission had been opera-
tional at the beginning of the Darfur conflict, it could have focused
on a coordinated response much earlier.
DISCUSSIONS SURROUNDING A STANDING RAPID
REACTION FORCE MUST BEGIN
Ultimately, a troop presence will be the quickest and most
effective mechanism for preventing genocide. Nearly insurmount-
able sovereignty issues arise when individual states are charged with
the task of committing troops. A standing rapid reaction force
under a UN commander could prove more acceptable. If the man-
date was sufficiently limited to protecting civilians or a safe area for
internally displaced persons, the decision to deploy could mirror
other humanitarian interventions for disease or famine, instead of
wasting precious months and even years waiting for a Security
Council resolution providing a mandate for a multilateral force.
Regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and
the European Union (EU) have already taken steps towards a rapid
reaction force, but they may prove insufficient alone to prevent
genocide. The AU Charter requires active intervention in other
member states, but deployment is predicated on a finding of geno-
cide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. The EU is on the
verge of establishing a rapid response force with several units of
1,500 troops each that can be used worldwide pending unanimous
consent of the European Council of Ministers. While these meas-
ures are a welcome approach to conflict prevention, the political
elements of deployment may be insufficient to actually prevent
genocide. An international approach coordinated with a central
Genocide Commission is necessary. 
In addition, discussions should begin regarding the discretion
of the troop commander. The only way to truly prevent genocide
is to empower the commander with the authority to act as he or
she sees fit to prevent genocidal acts. This may be a very contro-
versial measure, but it could allow for intervention only when civil-
ians are unduly targeted, while remaining neutral in any underly-
ing conflict between combatants. 
The obstacles to a rapid reaction force are great, but so are the
risks of not establishing adequate institutions in the wake of the
New arrivals to UNHCR camps in eastern Chad make shelters of branch-
es and blankets. The refugees must wait up to a month for a tent (Irba
Refugee Camp, August 2004). 
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continued on page 21
grams should emphasize that the residency requirement will not be
used as a means of undermining the importance of an individual
ethnic identity in Nigeria. Finally, the federal government should
work with state officials and traditional rulers to encourage con-
tinued dialogue between ethnic communities in order to empha-
size peacekeeping and prevent further violence. 
CONCLUSION
THE RECENT CONFLICT IN NIGERIA’S PLATEAU STATE signals a
need for the government to address the indigene/settler dichotomy by
implementing long-term legislative and policy changes. The
Constitution should be amended so that citizenship is based on resi-
dency and not on indigene status. Predictably, the successful applica-
tion of any constitutional amendments hinges on the citizens’ beliefs
that the new laws will be applied fairly. The government must there-
fore demonstrate, at both the federal and state level, that government
officials and individuals will be held accountable for using ethnic ori-
gin as a means of discriminating against and marginalizing other citi-
zens. Furthermore, Constitutional reform should be coupled with
locally implemented educational programs aimed at promoting inter-
ethnic awareness and tolerance, and an understanding of the colonial
origins of “them” versus “us” ethnic relations in Nigeria today.
Ultimately, these changes are necessary in order for Nigerians to see
themselves as equal citizens instead of ethnic groups pitted against
each other in a struggle to secure land and political power. HRB
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second genocide in a decade. If this reaction model had existed in
the early 90’s, a rapid reaction force could have saved hundreds of
thousands of lives in Rwanda and tens of thousands could have
been saved in Darfur. The world demands at least a serious discus-
sion of the merits of armed intervention.
HUMANITARIAN INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE FUNDED AT
CRISIS LEVELS IN ADVANCE
The humanitarian reaction to Darfur has been hampered by the
failure of many nations to fulfill their commitments. On the ground,
refugees and internally displaced persons who have already experi-
enced the horrors of genocide still lack adequate food, clean water and
basic supplies. In the UNHCR camps in eastern Chad, new arrivals
still must wait up to a month for a tent, living unprotected in areas
where the temperature can soar above 110 degrees. Rains and a
reliance on ground delivery of goods along poor roads hamper ship-
ments of humanitarian aid.
It does not have to be this way. The world needs to fund human-
itarian agencies at crisis levels and replenish those resources while a cri-
sis is occurring. There should be no excuse for illness or death when
the money to prevent it has been promised but not yet delivered.
THE FUTURE OF DARFUR
THE WORLD MAY ACT TO PREVENT A FUTURE GENOCIDE, but
what of Darfur? Concrete steps still need to be taken to halt the
genocide and return the civilian population to pre-conflict condi-
tions of life.
IMMEDIATELY FULFILL HUMANITARIAN COMMITMENTS
Clearing barriers to aid delivery can save hundreds of thou-
sands of lives. The UNHCR and other aid agencies badly need
funds to ensure that aid can be provided and delivered to the 2.25
million Darfurians in need. The United States has largely fulfilled
its commitments, but other major actors need to deliver on aid
promises.
ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE AFRICAN UNION
PROTECTION FORCE
The African Union has answered the call that the rest of the
international community ignored in terms of committing troops
and protecting monitors. Now that the AU force is projected to
reach a still-inadequate level of 3,000 troops, the United States and
other major powers should support the force with financial and
logistical support. Helicopters, transport planes, and vehicles are
badly needed. 
The United States and other world powers also should discuss
planning and resources in anticipation of a larger AU force. While
the increase to 3,000 troops is welcome and necessary, it is not suf-
ficient to protect the 2.25 million Darfurians still at risk of direct
conflict and a lack of humanitarian aid.
In addition, other multilateral organizations, such as the new
EU rapid reaction force and NATO, should provide assistance to
the AU force to establish a united international response to the
security situation.
SEPARATE GENOCIDE FROM THE ABUJA PEACE PROCESS
Many major powers, including the United States, have pro-
vided at least tacit support for the Abuja peace process between
the Darfurian rebels and the Sudanese government. While the
resolution of this conflict is essential to a return to normalcy for
Darfur, the peace process should be treated as wholly separate
from genocide and humanitarian needs. A response to genocide
should not and cannot wait for a diplomatic resolution between
the two parties.
PRESS KHARTOUM FOR THE RIGHT OF RETURN
While the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is paramount, pressure
must be placed by the UN and major powers on the Sudanese gov-
ernment to ensure the right of return for Darfurian civilians to their
home areas with security. If the right of return is not secured early and
enforced, the genocide will be a success. 
CONCLUSION
WITH GREAT CRISIS COMES GREAT OPPORTUNITY. The Rwandan
genocide left a legacy of empty promises. The world again stands
at a crossroads with genocide, but this time the world can establish
permanent institutions that can adequately prevent a future crisis.
In ten years, the legacy of Darfur should be seen as the point where
the world stopped dispensing rhetoric and started acting to prevent
its most heinous crime. After all, the focus should never be on
what we can do, but rather on what must be done. HRB
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